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Abstract
Single Event Upsets (SEU) as well as permanent faults
can significantly affect the correct on-line operation of digi-
tal systems, such as memories and microprocessors; a mem-
ory can be made resilient to permanent and transient faults
by using modular redundancy and coding. In this paper,
different memory systems are compared: these systems uti-
lize simplex and duplex arrangements with a combination
of Reed Solomon coding and scrubbing. The memory sys-
tems and their operations are analyzed by novel Markov
chains to characterize performance for dynamic reconfigu-
ration as well as error detection and correction under the
occurrence of permanent and transient faults. For a specific
Reed Solomon code, the duplex arrangement allows to effi-
ciently cope with the occurrence of permanent faults, while
the use of scrubbing allows to cope with transient faults.
Index Terms: High Reliability Systems, Reliability Eval-
uation, Reed-Solomon Codes, Scrubbing, Dynamic Redun-
dancy.
1. Introduction
A generic approach to fault tolerance is seldom very ef-
ficient due to the diversity of applications and requirements
as well as innovations in technology. For example, mag-
netic tape recorders have been extensively used to store the
large amount of data commonly generated by the on-board
instrumentation of satellites. However, their mechanical
and electro-mechanical parts have insufficient flexibility to
attain fault tolerance and reliability for long-term space mis-
sions. Moreover, the rapid growth in capacity of semi-
conductor memories and their compact size have permitted
the development of Solid State Mass Memories (SSMMs),
which are preferred over tape recorders due to their higher
reliability [6]. However, the requirements of low latency,
high throughput and large storage capacity of a SSMM may
not be fully met by space certified components. Commer-
cial Off The Shelf (COTS) offer better performance in terms
of storage capacity, access speed and power consumption
as compared with space-certified components. COTS how-
ever lacks resilience to both transient and permanent faults
which commonly occur in a space environment. Memo-
ries are usually made fault tolerant by using a combina-
tion of Error Detection And Correction (EDAC) codes [3],
and system-level techniques (such as sparing and scrubbing
[2][10]). An EDAC code improves both the reliability of the
storage system and data integrity (i.e. the probability that
data is correctly stored in memory over a specified period
of time); in this paper a class of maximum distance sep-
arable EDAC codes (known as Reed-Solomon codes, RS)
is used. RS codes have been widely employed for trans-
mission and storage due to their flexibility in the choice of
dataword and codeword lengths. Modular sparing has been
shown to improve the reliability of a memory system by
replacing faulty modules or units (mostly affected by per-
manent faults). Scrubbing [2] which basically consists of
periodically reading the content of the memory and correct-
ing possible errors, improves data integrity by reducing the
catastrophic accumulation of multiple transient errors (such
as SEUs). Hence, the reliability of a memory system us-
ing these techniques is closely related to the occurrence of
permanent faults (e.g. stuck-at, coupling etc), while data in-
tegrity is mainly related to the occurrence of transient faults
resulting in errors (e.g. SEU), which can modify the value
of the stored data.
The goal of this paper is to propose different arrange-
ments (simplex and duplex) for a memory system which
utilizes RS codes as EDAC; the objectives are to achieve re-
silience to both transient and permanent faults and retaining
data integrity. In particular, the duplication of the mem-
ory modules (duplex) allows to cope with the occurrence
of permanent faults, while the RS coding and the periodic
execution of scrubbing allow to reduce the impact of tran-
sient faults. The performance of these fault tolerant memory
systems is evaluated in terms of Bit Error Rate (BER) by
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Markov modeling for on-line reconfiguration.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines
the basic principles of RS codes, while in Section 3 the de-
scription of a simplex and the proposed duplex systems are
provided. Preliminaries are given in Section 4. Section 5 il-
lustrates the modeling method for estimating data integrity
in both the simplex and the proposed duplex systems. Fi-
nally, in Section 6 analysis and conclusions are provided.
2 Review of Reed Solomon Coding
Reed Solomon codes [3] are widely used for both data
transmission and storage systems. A RS(n,k) code [3] is
defined by the integer values of the two parameters n and
k, where n denotes the number of symbols of m bits (with
n ≤ 2m − 1) of a codeword and k denotes the number of
symbols of the related dataword. A RS(n,k) code can cor-
rect up to 2er + re ≤ n − k erroneous bits, where er is
the number of erasures and re is the number of random er-
rors. For data transmission, a random error occurs when a
symbol of the received codeword differs from the transmit-
ted symbol in an unknown location of the codeword. An
erasure is said to occur when the channel-side information
(available from the receiver) allows to locate the erroneous
symbol in the codeword. For a memory system, the follow-
ing assumptions are applicable:
1) Transient faults (e.g. SEU) can occur in an unknown lo-
cation (bit) of a codeword, therefore they can be effectively
considered as random errors.
2) Permanent faults (e.g. stuck-at 0/1) can be located using
either self-checking circuits, or on-line testing; therefore,
they can be effectively considered as erasures.
Locating a permanent fault is necessary to exploit the er-
ror correction capability of the RS codes. Until the perma-
nent fault is located, the error correction algorithm assumes
the erroneous behavior to be caused by a random error, thus
degrading the overall error correction capability of the pro-
vided code. When the permanent fault is located, the capa-
bility of the RS code can be fully exploited. The location of
permanent faults can be achieved using different methods as
found in the technical literature. For example, a permanent
fault in a memory chip can be detected by monitoring the
quiescent supply current (Iddq) [9].
Furthermore, a technique known as scrubbing can be ap-
plied [2] to deal with the simulataneous presence (accumu-
lation) of random errors in a codeword. Memory scrub-
bing basically consists of periodically reading a codeword,
correcting the possible erroneous symbols and rewriting the
corrected codeword to the same memory location. The us-
age of memory scrubbing must be carefully tuned to the
system requirements as it also introduces some drawbacks.
These are an increase of hardware overhead due to the nec-
essary control circuitry, a reduction in memory availability
during the scrubbing operations and an increase in power
consumption.
3 Simplex and Duplex Configurations
In this paper two configurations for a memory system
based on Reed-Solomon coding, are considered:
1) A simplex system makes use of a Reed-Solomon code
and related co-decoder. In this configuration, n coded sym-
bols are read by the decoder and k data symbols are pro-
vided as output.
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Figure 1. Duplex system block diagram
2) A duplex system with RS coding is shown in Fig. 1.
This is based on the duplication of the memory module with
an arbiter as decision circuit. This circuit operates as fol-
lows: initially, it attempts to recover from possible erasures
occurring in either of the two words. Once the location of
the erasures is established by the self-checking hardware,
the arbiter masks erasures (provided that they do not occur
in the same symbols of the words in the two modules). Fol-
lowing this operation, the arbiter separately decodes the two
words to detect errors and correct them. Due to the lim-
ited correction capability of the code, mis-correction (i.e.
correcting the erroneous word with yet another erroneous
codeword) may occur. A flag is set when a correction has
been performed and completed. Next, the arbiter proceeds
by comparing the two words.
-If no flag is set, then one of the two words is provided
as output (no error/fault present).
-If the two words are equal and at least one flag is set,
then one of the two words is provided as output; in this case,
the right correction has been performed. Note that the case
of simultaneous mis-corrections (i.e. erroneous corrections
leading to the same incorrect codeword) is not considered
(masking error) due to its unlikely occurrence.
-If the two words are different and one of the two flags is
set, then the word corresponding to the reset flag is provided
as output. In this case, a mis-correction has occurred in the
word corresponding to the module with the set flag.
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-If the two words are different and both flags are set, the
arbiter does not provide an output. Due to the duplex op-
eration, the arbiter is not capable to discriminate between a
correction and a mis-correction.
4 Preliminaries
Initially, the following definitions are introduced.
Definition: λ is the fault exposure (or rate) of a single
flipped bit (this is also known as SEU rate on a single bit).
Definition: λe is the erasure exposure of a symbol.
Definition: Tsc denotes the scrubbing operation period.
Definition: BER is the Bit Error Rate i.e. the number of
bits with errors divided by the total number of bits that have
been read over a given time period (in percentage).
The systems considered in this paper have been mod-
eled using Markov chains, which are particularly suitable
for BER evaluation [8]. To limit the problem of state ex-
plosion associated with Markov models of large and com-
plex systems, only a word of a memory module (and its cor-
responding copy in the other module in the case of the du-
plex system) has been considered. However, the extension
by considering the whole memory (memories) is straight-
forward and does not affect the ultimate correctness of the
proposed models.
The following possible system operations and events
have been considered as causing transitions in the Markov
state diagrams:
1)A random error (bit-flip due to SEU) may occur in a
word. This event leads the system to move to a neighboring
state in which the effect of the bit-flip is considered.
2)Erasures have been considered over the symbols of the
memory word encoded by the Reed Solomon code. Era-
sures cause the system to move to a neighboring state.
3)A scrubbing operation leads the system to a state char-
acterized by the same number of permanent faults and no
transient fault.
The following additional assumptions are made:
-When considering reliability, the inability to produce a
correct output is considered to be a failure.
-Random errors on the same symbol are not considered.
-As in previous works in the technical literature, the ar-
biter (as decision circuit) is always assumed to be error-free
(i.e. it is a hard core component).
5 Proposed Markov Models
Consider initially the simplex arrangement for the mem-
ory system, which has been introduced in [7]. The states
S(er, re) of the Markov Chain (CTMC) can be uniquely
identified by the values of er and re The initial state at
T = 0 (or Good state) is denoted as G = S(0, 0); in
this state er = re = 0. Similarly, the unrecoverable er-
ror state (or Fail state) F = S(er, re) is a state in which
(er + 2× re) > n− k.
The Markovian model of a RS coded simplex memory
system capable to correct up to t random errors (where t =
n−k
2 ) is shown in Fig.2. Further details can be found in [7].
Figure 2. Markov model of a RS coded simplex
memory system
According to the definition of BER and by considering
that PS(n)(t) is the time dependent solution of the Markov
Chain (i.e., the probability of being in state S(n) at time t),
the BER of the system at time t can be written as [7]:
BER(t) = m×
(n− k)
k
× PS(n)(t) (1)
 
b= number of mixed errors
e1= number of single symbol random errors on word1
e2= number of single symbol random errors on word 2
ec= number of double symbol random errors
Y= number of double symbol erasures
X= number of single symbol erasures
bfx=bit−flip on bit x
er= erasure
symbol
WORD 2
WORD 1
er
er
er
er
er
bfi bfi
bfi
bfi
bfi
bfjer
bfibfi
X YY b b e1 e2 ec ec
= m bits
Figure 3. State definition in the Markov chain
Consider next the duplex memory system with the RS
code. Six different parameters, depending on the erasures
and random errors occurred, can be considered to character-
ize each state; they are defined in Fig.3, which shows two
corresponding words in the replicated modules, as follows:
- X is the number of erasures on the same symbols in
both words.
- Y is the number of erasures in symbols belonging to one
of the two words, while the same symbol in the replicated
module is error-free.
- e1,e2 are the number of random errors (bit-flips) in ei-
ther of the two words (word 1 or word 2 respectively), but
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not in the same symbol of the other word.
- ec is the number of random errors which have occurred
in corresponding symbols of the two codewords (indepen-
dently on the position of the bit-flip in the symbol itself).
- b is the number of occurrences of an erasure and a ran-
dom error in same symbols of the two replicated modules.
X, Y, b, e1, e2−1, ec+1
X, Y, b, e1−1, e2, ec+1
X+1, Y−1, b, e1, e2, ec
X, Y, b+1, e1, e2, ec−1
X+1, Y, b−1, e1, e2, ec
X, Y+1, b, e1, e2−1, ec E
O
N
M
L
I
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F
D
C
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y
e2
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X, Y−1, b+1, e1, e2, ec
X, Y+1, b, e1−1, e2, ec
X, Y, b, e1, e2+1, ec
mλ
mλ
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eceλ
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e1eλ
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λ
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mλ
−e1−e2−ec)(n−x−y−bmλX, Y, b, e1+1, e2, ec
(n−x−y−b−e1−e2−ec)m
Figure 4. Generic state of duplex system
A state transition in the Markov chain model is caused
both by events (i.e. random errors and erasures) and mem-
ory operations (scrubbing). Fig.4 shows all possible tran-
sitions from a generic state due to erasures and random er-
rors. Note that the occurrence of a transition must satisfy the
boundary conditions for the correct capabilities of the code
employed. Therefore, from a generic state (characterized
by the 6-tuple (X,Y, b, e1, e2, ec)) the possible transitions
due to erasures are to the following states:
• A is characterized by the 6-tuple (X + 1, Y −
1, b, e1, e2, ec). Transitions to state A are caused by an era-
sure on a symbol for which the same symbol in the dupli-
cated module already has an erasure (at a rate λe · Y ).
• B is characterized by the 6-tuple (X + 1, Y, b −
1, e1, e2, ec). Transitions to state B are caused by the oc-
currence of an erasure on a symbol already affected by a
random error (bit-flip), and for which the same symbol in
the duplicated module presents an erasure too. The transi-
tion rate is given by λe · Y .
• C is characterized by the 6-tuple (X,Y +
1, b, e1, e2, ec). Transitions to state C are caused by
the occurrence of an erasure on a symbol such that this
symbol and the same symbol in the duplicated word were
not previously affected by random error or erasures. The
transition rate is λe · (n−X − Y − b− e1− e2− ec).
•D, E are characterized by the 6-tuples (X,Y +1, b, e1−
1, e2, ec) and (X,Y +1, b, e1, e2−1, ec), respectively. If an
erasure occurs to a word previously corrupted by a random
error (and whose homologous is error-free) then the system
enters the D or E state. The transition rate is given by λe ·e1
or λe · e2, respectively.
• F is characterized by the 6-tuple (X,Y, b +
1, e1, e2, ec − 1). A permanent fault occurring (with rate
λe · ec) to a symbol such that this symbol and the same
symbol in the duplicated word were previously affected by
random error takes the system to state F .
•G, H are characterized by the 6-tuples (X,Y, b+1, e1−
1, e2, ec) and (X,Y, b+1, e1, e2− 1, ec), respectively. The
system enters these states at the occurrence of an erasure
on a previously error-free symbol, whose same symbol is
affected by a random error. Transitions to G or H are char-
acterized by a rate λe · e1 or λe · e2 respectively.
Similarly, if the boundary conditions are satisfied, the
random errors (SEU causing bit-flips) cause the system to
move to the following states:
• I is characterized by the 6-tuple (X,Y − 1, b +
1, e1, e2, ec). Transitions to state I occur with rate (m·λ·Y ),
where m is the number of bits per symbol . They are caused
by a random error occurring on a symbol, whose same sym-
bol is affected by an erasure.
• L, M are characterized by the 6-tuples (X,Y, b, e1 +
1, e2, ec) and (X,Y, b, e1, e2 + 1, ec), respectively. Tran-
sitions to these states occur following a random error on a
symbol whose same symbol is error-free. Their rate is given
by λ ·m · (n− x− y − b− e1− e2− ec).
• N, O are characterized by the 6-tuples (X,Y, b, e1 −
1, e2, ec+ 1) and (X,Y, b, e1, e2− 1, ec+ 1), respectively.
The occurrence of a random error on a symbol whose same
symbol is already affected by a random error causes a tran-
sition to one of these states. The rates of these transitions
are m · λ · e1 and m · λ · e2 respectively.
As per the analysis of BER for data storage, two system
operations have been considered, namely read and scrub-
bing. The ability of the system to provide a correct output
as result of a read operation is limited on each module by
the condition (2re + er) ≤ n − k. In the proposed duplex
system, prior to any reading/scrubbing an erasure recovery
operation is performed; therefore, the total number of era-
sures er is X while erasures on only one of the two homolo-
gous symbols (Y ) can thus be masked by the arbiter. As for
the total random errors on each word, re is given by the sum
of b, ec, and e1 or e2 respectively. Eventually all possible
transitions shown in Fig. 4 may occur to characterize the
next system configuration. However, either of the following
conditions must be satisfied:
{
X + 2b+ 2ec+ 2e1 ≤ n− k
X + 2b+ 2ec+ 2e2 ≤ n− k
Otherwise, the system reaches an unrecoverable error
state (or Fail state). Read operations are not explicitly
considered in the proposed model: a read operation corre-
sponds to the so-called stopping time of a performed simu-
lation. If the system is then in the Fail state, the read opera-
tion is unsuccessful. Else, a correct output is provided.
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Similarly, a scrubbing operation is not successful when it
is performed from a state which does not satisfy the bound-
ary conditions, leading the system to the Fail state. Oth-
erwise, a scrubbing operation causes a transition to a state
characterized by the same number of permanent faults and
no random error (thus to a state characterized by the 6-tuple
(X,Y +b, 0, 0, 0, 0)). Scrubbing is executed at a prescribed
frequency characterized by a rate 1
Tsc
.
6 Analysis and Discussion
The solution and evaluation in terms of BER(t) of the
proposed Markov models have been accomplished by using
the SURE solver[4]. In the evaluation, rates for transient
fault were varied from 7.3× 10−7 errors/bit/day to a maxi-
mum of 1.7×10−5. As the rate of permanent faults depends
on the reliability of the memory chips, then it can be estab-
lished using for example the models of [6], [1].
In particular, the following three cases are considered:
1) comparison of simplex and duplex RS(18,16) with no
scrubbing and variable SEU rate;
2) analysis of duplex RS(18,16) for different Tsc periods
and under the worst case scenario of the SEU rate;
3) comparison of simplex and duplex RS(18,16), and sim-
plex RS(18,16) under different rates for permanent faults.
For cases 1) and 2), it is assumed that data is stored in the
memory for 2 days (Tst = 48h); therefore BER has been
calculated during this time interval. The first evaluation has
been performed on the simplex and duplex systems with
RS(18,16) without scrubbing, no permanent fault and at a
rate for transient faults given by λ ∈ [7.3 × 10−7, 1.7 ×
10−5]. The BERs of the two systems are reported in Figure
5 and Figure 6; the values for the BER are in the same
range for all considered transient fault rates (of course, the
duplex arrangement is expected to be particularly resilient
to permanent faults, as also shown later in this section).
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Figure 5. BER of simplex RS(18,16) under dif-
ferent SEU rates
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Figure 6. BER of duplex RS(18,16) under dif-
ferent SEU rates
As for the duplex configuration, Figure 7 shows the im-
provement in BER due to scrubbing. For this example a
worst case transient faults scenario has been considered by
setting λ = 1.7 × 10−5. Using a duplex system with the
RS(18,16) code, a scrubbing frequency of lower than once
per hour is sufficient to maintain the BER below 10−6.
This confirms previous results [7] on the simplex memory
system using different RS codes.
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Figure 7. BER of duplex RS(18,16), fixed tran-
sient fault rate, variable scrubbing period
Note that a RS(18,16) code in a duplex memory system
implies the same amount of redundant code symbols as in a
simplex system with a RS(36,16) code. Therefore, also this
case is considered. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the compar-
ison of the RS(18,16) simplex, duplex and RS(36,16) sim-
plex. These three cases are considered for the occurrence of
permanent faults (over a period of 24 months for permanent
storage of data in the memory). The RS(18,16) duplex has
significantly better performance than the simplex memory,
but it shows a degradation in performance compared with a
simplex system employing a RS(36,16) code.
Consider next the decoder complexity. The time for
Reed Solomon decoding (Td) depends on the codeword
length and on the number of code symbols as Td  3n +
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Figure 8. BER of simplex RS(18,16), different
permanent fault rates, with no scrubbing.
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Figure 9. BER of duplex RS(18,16), different
permanent fault rates, with no scrubbing.
10(n − k); this complexity has been reported in [5] for the
performance of a RS codec IP core for FPGA implementa-
tion. The value of Td is in clock cycles for performing the
decoding operation on a non time-continuous access pro-
file as applicable to memory. Therefore, for a RS (36,16)
decoder Td  108 + 200 = 308 while for a RS (18,16)
Td  54 + 20 = 74, i.e. the decoding access time to
the stored data is more than four times higher using the RS
(36,16) arrangement than the simplex or duplex RS (18,16).
A further metric that has been evaluated, is the area of
the decoder. The number of logic gates required for im-
plementing a Reed Solomon decoder, is almost linearly de-
pendent on m and the number of check symbols n− k [5];
therefore, a single RS(36,16) decoder will require more area
than two RS(18,16) decoders for the duplex arrangement.
The increase in area must be carefully evaluated when the
physical constraints on electronic equipment are very tight;
moreover, a substantial increase in decoder area also im-
plies an increase in the non-fault tolerant components, thus
ultimately degrading the overall reliability of the system.
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Figure 10. BER of simplex RS(36,16), differ-
ent permanent fault rates, with no scrubbing.
In conclusion, the novel Markov models presented in this
paper have analytically shown that Reed Solomon codes
can be efficiently employed in high reliable memory sys-
tems; albeit ultimately application dependent, redundancy
and coding can be combined to attain data integrity and
resilience to errors due to transient (SEU) and permanent
faults. Different figures of merit such as BER and decod-
ing complexity (in time and area) have been analyzed in
depth. The proposed models have provided an accurate and
flexible evaluation tool which can be used to assess the via-
bility of SSMMs for long mission time in space exploration.
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